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SUBJECT Soviet Attitude Toward Berlin Conference

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1. The acceptance by the Soviet Government of Western terms for the Berlin conference created considerable differences of opinion in the Kremlin, criticism centering around the reaction that would be provoked in China. A powerful group in the presidium, headed by A. N. Kosygin, opposed Soviet participation unless the recognition of Red China as a member of the UN were accepted as a preliminary condition.
2. This group was outwitted by Malenkov's promptitude in naming Molotov as chief negotiator in Berlin. In the atmosphere of uncertainty produced by the hurried execution of the Beria group, Molotov did not have time to form a real opposition to this maneuver. He is of the opinion that in case the conference fails-and he believes failure to be unavoidable-he will be made responsible and not Malenkov, who is really responsible for Soviet participation. As a result Molotov is not expected to make a strong impression during the Berlin conference, and is expected to try to find a solid pretext for not making a personal appearance.
3. Kosygin's group has been disappointed with Molotov's weakness and has gained the support of D. N. Zaslavski, the important political commentator, who is intriguing behind the scenes against which he calls the abandonment of China.
4. With a view to counteracting this campaign Malenkov decided to send to China his new protégé, I. F. Tevoysan, Minister of Mining, who was rewarded by promotion to Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for his betrayal

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of V. N. Merkulov. Tevoysan left at once for Peiping. He was designated as chief Soviet representative at the celebration for the Anshan combine, and was much surprised to find Mao Tse-Tung's attitude toward his designation was hostile. Mao Tse-Tung refused to greet Tevoysan and withdrew from the Anshan celebration.

5. Also disgruntled is A. I. Mikoyan, founder of the Soviet policy in external trade, who considers himself the most qualified negotiator with the West. Mikoyan is convinced that the US, deserted by Britain and France and desirous of trade with the East as the only solution of economic difficulties, will make concessions at Berlin, and does not wish to let Malenkov draw all the political benefits from these concessions.
6. Relations between Malenkov and Mikoyan have worsened since Beria's execution, and there are indications that the Berlin conference is only postponing another Kremlin purge.
7. Malenkov and Khrushchev are satisfied that the Berlin conference will mean the end of EDC (European Defense Community) and will strengthen neutralism in Europe. These results, together with the beginning of an economic crisis in the Western hemisphere, are expected to open opportunities for Communist underground pressure. Malenkov and Khrushchev are not afraid of any bad effects of a failure of the Berlin conference within the Soviet bloc, but there is much speculation about how such a failure would affect the West. Thus no spectacular Soviet moves, especially concerning Germany and Austria, are to be expected at Berlin. The Soviet line will be the acceptance of further negotiations and a demonstration of good will with regard to the increase of trade and cultural exchange.

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